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inTroduCTion
An Argentinean court recently convicted the former President of Argentina, General Jorge Videla, of com-mitting a number of serious human rights violations 
during his reign of terror over thirty years ago.1 The path to 
his conviction was long and complex, as investigations and 
prosecutions of serious human rights violations generally are. 
The reason for this is the host of knotty factual and legal issues 
such investigations usually raise, including whether the suspects 
are still alive; whether the government in 
office has the political will to support the 
investigations of the violations; whether the 
competent courts are able to collect evidence 
of the commission of the violations and of the 
guilt of the alleged perpetrators; and, whether 
statutory limitations or amnesty laws are in 
force that would prevent the investigation and 
prosecution of the violations.
This article will briefly describe, explain, 
and analyze the three most important legal 
issues complicating the possible investiga-
tion and prosecution of human rights viola-
tions committed in Argentina during General 
Videla’s military dictatorship, as well as how 
the Argentinean Supreme Court of Justice 
(Supreme Court) has resolved these issues. 
The first issue is whether the human rights 
violations committed during the dictator-
ship were subject to statutory limitations. 
Second, whether the so-called “Amnesty 
Laws” enacted by the Congress of Argentina 
could be lawfully nullified with retroactive effect. Third, whether 
the presidential pardons in favor of those involved in political 
violence could be lawfully nullified with retroactive effect. 
Many factual issues, even if critical to an overall assessment of 
whether suspects are likely to be convicted, are not discussed in 
this article.
The first section will provide some background informa-
tion on the events preceding the current trials for past human 
rights violations in Argentina. The next section will show how 
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the Supreme Court has resolved these three legal issues by 
directly applying provisions of the American Convention on 
Human Rights (ACHR) as interpreted by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and customary international 
law. Finally, the conclusion will note that although the Supreme 
Court’s legal findings concerning the interpretation and applica-
tion of the ACHR were well reasoned, the same cannot be said 
with regard to the Supreme Court’s interpretations of jus cogens 
and customary international law. Be that as it may, by resolving 
those three legal hurdles, the Supreme Court 
has paved the way for the investigation of 
the serious human rights abuses committed 
during General Videla’s dictatorship and the 
prosecution of those responsible.
baCkground inFormaTion
In March 1976, the Argentinean military, 
led by General Videla, overthrew the govern-
ment presided over by Isabel Martínez de 
Perón. General Videla’s dictatorship lasted 
until December 10, 1983, when the demo-
cratically elected President Raúl Alfonsín 
took office. Alfonsín immediately faced 
the challenge of setting out the appropri-
ate mechanisms to investigate the fate of 
the desaparecidos (individuals who were 
forcefully disappeared during the dicta-
torship). To this end, Alfonsín created the 
National Commission on the Disappeared 
five days after his inauguration as president. 
As a commission of inquiry, Alfonsín charged 
the National Commission on the Disappeared with the task of 
receiving statements concerning crimes committed and trans-
mitting them to the courts having jurisdiction over the events. 
However, the Commission did not have the power to determine 
legal responsibility itself. In September 1984, the Commission 
published a report entitled Nunca Más (Never Again), which 
documented the forced disappearance of over 9,000 people and 
recommended the prosecution of those responsible.2
Nunca Más formed the evidentiary basis for instituting 
criminal proceedings against the nine members of the first three 
military juntas. These proceedings are known worldwide as the 
“Juntas Trial,” which resulted in the conviction of five of the 
accused, including Videla, and the acquittal of the remaining 
four.3 However, the exemplary Juntas Trial was followed by the 
enactment of two laws and two presidential decrees that led to 















impunity for the perpetrators and accomplices of the most seri-
ous human rights violations ever committed in Argentina.
In December 1986, the Argentine Congress passed Law No. 
23.492 (Ley de Punto Final) and in June 1987, it passed Law 
No. 23.521 (Ley de Obediencia Debida).4 The first of the two 
laws foreclosed the possibility of penal action against military 
and security officials who participated in operations to “repress 
terrorism” following Videla’s coup d’état.5 The second of the 
two laws stipulated the non-rebuttable presumption that mid- 
and low-ranking military and security officials had committed 
the crimes specified in the law only pursuant to superior orders 
and therefore could not be held accountable for their actions.6 
These laws effectively terminated the pending criminal proceed-
ings instituted against such officials and rendered impossible the 
launch of new investigations and prosecutions against them. In 
October 1989, recently elected President Carlos Menem granted 
a collective pardon to about fifty additional high-ranking mili-
tary officials under prosecution for acts of “State terrorism.”7 In 
December 1990, Menem granted another pardon to the members 
of the military juntas convicted during the Juntas Trial.8
Since these laws and presidential decrees came into effect, 
non-governmental organizations such as Madres de Plaza de 
Mayo and the Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, as well 
as international organs such as the Inter-American Commission 
of Human Rights (IACHR), have pushed for Argentina to adopt 
a new legal framework to facilitate the further investigation of 
crimes committed and the prosecution of those responsible. 
Such a framework would include creating legislation to nullify 
the Amnesty Laws and presidential pardons. In this vein, the 
Argentine Congress declared the Amnesty Laws null and void 
with retroactive effect in 2003. However, at the time, it was 
unclear what the Supreme Court would decide regarding the 
constitutionality of this controversial legislation.9 In essence, in 
order to launch investigations into human rights abuses by the 
military and prosecute those responsible, three main legal issues 
had to be resolved.
Three major legal iSSueS
The Supreme Court resolved the three major legal hurdles 
to prosecutions in three successive cases. In 2004, in Arancibia 
Clavel, the court resolved whether the human rights violations 
committed during the military dictatorship were subject to 
statutory limitations. In 2005, in Simón and others, the court 
resolved whether the Amnesty Laws could be lawfully nulli-
fied with retroactive effect. In 2007, in Mazzeo and others, the 
court resolved whether the two presidential pardons granted by 
Menem could be lawfully nullified with retroactive effect. The 
Supreme Court resolved these issues by directly applying provi-
sions of the ACHR as interpreted by the IACtHR and customary 
international law.
statutoRy limitations
Enrique Arancibia Clavel was a member of Chile’s intel-
ligence service, Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (external 
DINA), whose main task was to implement Chile’s policy of 
persecution against opponents to the Pinochet regime living 
in Argentina. In 2000, the Oral Tribunal on Federal Criminal 
Matters convicted Arancibia Clavel of two murders and partici-
pation in a criminal organization (the external DINA) between 
1974 and 1978. He appealed the judgment, asserting that he 
should not have been convicted for his participation in a crimi-
nal organization because the ten-year statute of limitations for 
such crimes elapsed. The State of Chile, as the other party to the 
appellate proceedings, argued that the crime in question con-
stituted a crime against humanity and that such crimes are not 
subject to statutory limitations. The cassation chamber agreed 
with Arancibia Clavel’s argument and reversed his conviction 
for participation in a criminal organization. Chile appealed to 
the Supreme Court.10
The Supreme Court assessed the applicability of statu-
tory limitations to the crime at stake in accordance with the 
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations 
to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity (Statutory 
Limitations Convention), to which Argentina had been a party 
since 2003, and which also had recently been incorporated into 
the Constitution of Argentina.11 In order to determine whether 
the crime in question amounted to a crime against humanity, 
the Supreme Court evaluated the relevant facts in light of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Genocide Convention). It found that the facts corre-
sponded exactly to the conduct described in Article 25(3)(d) of 
the ICC Statute pertaining to individual criminal responsibility, 
Articles 2 and 3(b) of the Genocide Convention, and Article 
2 of the Statutory Limitations Convention.12 Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court found that because war crimes and crimes 
against humanity are jus cogens norms of international law, 
statutory limitations do not apply, even before the adoption of 
the Statutory Limitations Convention in 1968.13 Given that the 
crime in question amounted to a crime against humanity and that 
The Supreme Court [of Argentina] has paved the  
way for the investigation of the serious human rights 
abuses committed during General Videla’s dictatorship 
and the prosecution of those responsible.
17
crimes against humanity were not subject to statutory limita-
tions under customary international law at the relevant time, the 
court held that the period of limitation set in the Penal Code of 
Argentina should not have been applied.14
The Arancibia Clavel decision had several practical legal 
effects. The Supreme Court held that no statutory limitations 
would apply to the human rights abuses committed by the mili-
tary between 1976 and 1983. This holding, while significant, 
contained unconvincing legal reasoning. First, it is worth noting 
that crimes against humanity were not criminalized as such in 
the Penal Code of Argentina at the relevant time. As a result, 
a murder that amounted to a crime against humanity under 
international law would have been an “ordinary” crime subject 
to statutory limitations under Argentinean law. Hence, it made 
perfect sense for the Supreme Court to assess whether the crime 
matched conduct that amounted to a crime against humanity 
under international law.
However, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) has established that to determine whether 
conduct amounts to a crime under domestic law or interna-
tional law, both elements of the crime — the objective element 
(actus reus) and the subjective element (mens rea) — must be 
assessed.15 The Supreme Court failed to determine whether both 
elements of the crime corresponded with a crime against human-
ity at the relevant time. Instead, the Supreme Court only focused 
on the objective element, neglecting the subjective one. The 
Supreme Court also assessed the defendant’s conduct in light of 
the crimes enumerated in the ICC Statute, a legally questionable 
determination because this treaty was adopted more than twenty 
years after the commission of the crime at issue. Considering 
that the customary definition of crimes against humanity under-
went substantial evolution since 1915,16 it is not immediately 
apparent that the provision of the ICC Statute referred to by 
the Supreme Court to assess Arancibia Clavel’s conduct cor-
responded with the notion of crimes against humanity under 
customary international law in the 1970s.
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s finding that crimes against 
humanity were not subject to statutory limitations in the 1970s 
was also based on questionable legal grounds. The Supreme 
Court did not demonstrate the existence of a general practice 
accepted as law, nor did it refer to any ruling of an international 
court or to the opinion of learned scholars regarding statu-
tory limitations.17 Instead, the Supreme Court based its find-
ing on language in the preamble to the Statutory Limitations 
Convention, in which State parties “affirmed” the existence of 
the principle of the non-applicability of statutory limitations to 
crimes against humanity.18 This is not strong evidence of the 
existence of a relevant rule of customary international law at the 
time of the original crimes. One indication that this principle 
was not part of customary international law before the adoption 
of the Statutory Limitations Convention, is that the preamble 
used the word “affirmed” rather than “reaffirmed.”19
Despite these legal obstacles, by declaring the non-appli-
cability of statutory limitations to crimes against humanity 
committed in the 1970s, the Supreme Court overcame the first 
important legal impediment to the investigation and prosecution 
of the human rights violations committed in Argentina during 
those years. The following year, the Supreme Court considered 
the next legal impediment to such investigation and prosecution, 
the Amnesty Laws.
amnesty laWs
The second legal hurdle consisted of determining whether 
the Amnesty Laws could be constitutionally nullified with 
retroactive effect. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in 
the Simón and others case.20 Julio Simón was a member of the 
Argentinean Federal Police and had been charged with kidnap-
ping, torture, and forced disappearance of persons. In 2001, 
the Federal Court for Criminal and Correctional Matters No. 
4 declared the Amnesty Laws unconstitutional because they 
violated the ACHR, Article 29 of the Constitution of Argentina, 
and a number of other human rights treaties to which Argentina 
was party.21After successive appeals the issue came before the 
Supreme Court.
By declaring the unconstitutionality of the Amnesty 
Laws, the Supreme Court [enabled] Simón and others 
responsible for criminal conduct [to be] convicted and 
sentenced for their egregious crimes.














The Supreme Court found the Amnesty Laws unconsti-
tutional for several reasons. First, since the adoption of the 
Amnesty Laws, international human rights law developed legal 
principles that prohibited states from enacting laws aimed at 
avoiding the investigation of crimes against humanity and the 
prosecution of the responsible people.22 By incorporating the 
ACHR and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights into the Constitution, Argentina assumed the duty to 
prosecute crimes against humanity under international law.23 
Because the Amnesty Laws were designed to leave unpunished 
serious human rights violations, they violated these treaties, and 
the Constitution of Argentina.24 Moreover, the case law of the 
IACtHR established essential guidelines for the interpretation 
of the ACHR25 and the IACtHR held in Barrios Altos v. Peru 
that the state parties to the ACHR should not establish internal 
mechanisms that would thwart state compliance with the obliga-
tion to prosecute and investi-
gate serious and widespread 
human rights violations.26 
Therefore, Argentina was 
bound to abolish the Amnesty 
Laws, deprive them of legal 
effects, and overturn the pro-
hibition against the retroactive 
application of criminal law, 
leading to the detriment of the 
accused.27
The Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Simón and others was 
not unanimous. In his dissent, 
Judge Fayt pointed out several 
aspects of the majority’s rea-
soning with which he could 
not agree. First, he explained 
that the Argentine Congress did not have the power to declare 
unconstitutional the Amnesty Laws with retroactive effect, 
because this was a power of the judicial branch.28 Second, the 
application of the Inter-American Convention on the Enforced 
Disappearance of Persons violated the principle of legality to 
the detriment of the accused, as it was not in force at the time 
of the perpetration of crimes in question.29 Third, the Statutory 
Limitations Convention was not applicable because Argentina 
became a party to it in 1995, and its application to Simón was 
thus retroactive. Additionally, Judge Fayt asserted that in 1975 
forced disappearance was not yet considered a crime against 
humanity under customary international law.30 Furthermore, the 
application of international treaties by Argentinean courts must 
not prevent the application of the principle of legality, because 
it is a constitutional principle of public law.31 Moreover, Judge 
Fayt argued that the majority erred in invoking the IACtHR’s 
judgment in Barrios Altos as a precedent, because the amnesty 
laws examined by the IACtHR in that case consisted in self-
amnesty laws, unlike the Amnesty Laws in the case against 
Simón, enacted to excuse officials of the government in power 
from criminal responsibility.32
The majority’s decision raised controversies not only within 
the Supreme Court, but also in legal scholarship. On one side, 
some scholars highlight the fact that the Supreme Court has 
confirmed the important function of international law in gen-
eral and human rights law in particular in dealing with crimes 
against humanity.33 On the other side, there are scholars who 
believe that, notwithstanding the laudable aim of preventing and 
punishing all crimes against humanity, the decision was regret-
table because it ignored significant constitutional constraints, 
like the right to freedom from retroactive punishment by an ex 
post facto law.34
This decision clarified the constitutionality of the law passed 
by Congress in 2003 to nullify the Amnesty Laws with retroac-
tive effect. By declaring the unconstitutionality of the Amnesty 
Laws, the Supreme Court overcame the second legal impediment 
to the investigation and prosecution of the human rights viola-
tions committed in Argentina during the military dictatorship. 
Accordingly, Simón and others responsible for criminal conduct 
have been convicted and sentenced for their egregious crimes.35 
However, in order to fully 
investigate the crimes com-
mitted under General Videla’s 
dictatorship and to allow the 
prosecution of all the respon-
sible, one legal impediment 
still remained — the pardons 
granted by President Menem.
pResidential paRdons
The last legal impedi-
ment to the investigation and 
prosecution of the human 
rights abuses committed in 
Argentina during the military 
dictatorship were the presi-
dential pardons granted by 
President Menem in 1989 and 
1990. The Supreme Court had to determine whether the presi-
dential pardon granted by Decree 1002/89 was consistent with 
Argentina’s international obligations in the Mazzeo and others 
case.36
According to the Supreme Court, the alleged participation 
of the defendants in murders, kidnappings, torture, bodily harm, 
and trespassing amounted to crimes against humanity.37 Under 
the ACHR, states are obliged to investigate, prosecute, and pun-
ish individuals responsible for serious human rights breaches,38 
therefore Decree 1002/89 was inconsistent with the preemptory 
nature of crimes against humanity as a jus cogens norm of inter-
national law and the ACHR because it violated right of victims 
to an effective remedy and the right to discover the truth about 
such crimes.39 The Supreme Court held that Decree 1002/89 was 
therefore unconstitutional.40
The Supreme Court’s ruling was correct to the extent that it 
invoked the right provisions of the ACHR and case law of the 
IACtHR. However, the Supreme Court’s legal reasoning based 
on its understanding of jus cogens norms of international law 
was unconvincing. From the outset, it should be noted that the 
Supreme Court used the terms jus cogens and customary law 
as synonyms and, in so doing, it disregarded their conceptual 
difference.41 Here, it suffices to mention that (i) not all rules of 
customary international law are rules of jus cogens and (ii) rules 
of conventional law may amount to jus cogens. In his dissent, 
[T]he Supreme Court [of 
Argentina] used the terms 
jus cogens and customary 
law as synonyms and, in so 
doing, it disregarded their 
conceptual difference.
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Judge Fayt criticized the inconsistent use of both terms through-
out the decision.42
Perhaps most importantly, customary international law does 
not prohibit pardons of sentences for crimes at present, let alone 
in 1989 — the year in which Menem granted this pardon. In its 
reasoning, the Supreme Court did not demonstrate the existence 
of customary international law to that effect, a principle that 
could have been demonstrated through the existence of relevant 
state practice. Article 28 of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Article 27 
of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), and Article 23 of the Statute of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (SCSL), 
on pardons and com-
mutation of sentences, 
do not automatically 
rule out pardons for 
war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and 
genocide, but rather 
authorize the President 
of these judicial insti-
tutions to decide a 
request for pardon on 
the basis of the gen-
eral principles of law. 
The ICC Statute does 
not address the issue 
of requests for par-
don, which means that 
it does not explicitly 
rule them out. Hence, 
had customary inter-
national law prohib-
ited pardons for crimes 
against humanity at the 
time of the adoption of these four statutes (which were adopted 
after the pardons by Menem), their drafters probably would have 
inserted a provision in these instruments to that effect.
Furthermore, under customary international law, the obliga-
tion to punish international crimes does not appear to be abso-
lute. If it was, international criminal courts and tribunals would 
not, for example, be allowed to enter into plea agreements with 
defendants, as this practice usually entails dropping charges of 
international crimes and thus halting the investigation, prosecu-
tion, and punishment of the underlying conduct. Twenty such 
agreements have been concluded before ICTY, and several 
before the ICTR as well.43 Therefore, if the obligation to punish 
international crimes is not absolute, it does not make sense that 
pardons for crimes against humanity will automatically violate 
such obligations, as the Supreme Court suggested.
In sum, the Supreme Court’s decision is persuasive to the 
extent that it is grounded on the provisions of the ACHR and the 
case law of the IACtHR, because under this legal regime there 
is well-established case law prohibiting the enactment of laws 
such as the Amnesty Laws. On the other hand, the legal reason-
ing based on alleged norms of customary international law was 
unpersuasive.
ConCluSionS
The investigation and prosecution of the serious human 
rights violations committed in Argentina during the military 
dictatorship were paralyzed for approximately twenty years. The 
three most significant legal impediments to their investigation 
and prosecution were statutory limitations, Amnesty Laws, and 
presidential pardons. The Supreme Court resolved these legal 
hurdles by interpreting international law, particularly the ACHR 
as interpreted by the IACtHR and, more generally, norms of jus 
cogens and customary international law.
The power of the courts of Argentina to directly apply the 
provisions of the ACHR is uncontroversial because this treaty 
was incorporated into 
the Constitution of 
Argentina (Article 
75(22)) in 1994. The 
Supreme Court’s hold-
ing that the courts 
of Argentina ought 
to apply the ACHR’s 
provisions as inter-
preted by the IACtHR 
is logical because the 
ultimate objective 
of this judicial body 
is the application and 
the interpretation of 
the ACHR (and other 
human rights treaties). 
This explains why 
the annulment of the 
Amnesty Laws and 
presidential pardons 
on the ground that they 
were inconsistent with 
the ACHR as inter-
preted by the IACtHR was generally uncontroversial. However, 
Judge Fayt’s dissenting opinion in Simón and others pointed out 
that the majority inappropriately invoked Barrios Altos because 
it was not analogous to the case at stake.
The power of the Supreme Court to directly apply custom-
ary international law is also uncontroversial, as reflected by the 
Supreme Court’s case law.44 Yet, the Supreme Court’s treatment 
of customary international law in the three cases reviewed in this 
article was not very careful, for two reasons. First, in Arancibia 
Clavel and Mazzeo and others, the Supreme Court conflated the 
terms jus cogens and customary international law, disregarding 
their conceptual difference. Second, the Supreme Court applied 
rules of customary international law of questionable legal foun-
dation. In its decision, the Supreme Court failed to justify the 
existence of a rule of customary international law whereby (i) 
crimes against humanity in the 1970s were not subject to statu-
tory limitations and (ii) pardons for crimes against humanity 
are impermissible. While the application of the latter “rule” of 
customary international law did not alter the outcome of the 
proceedings (because this rule was applied in place of a more 
specific ACHR provision), the application of the former “rule” 
was crucial to the final adjudication of the case at hand.
[I]f the obligation to punish 
international crimes is not 
absolute, it does not make  
sense that pardons for 
crimes against humanity will 
automatically violate such 
obligations, as the Supreme Court  
[of Argentina] suggested.
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EnDnotEs: overcoming Domestic Legal Impediments to the Investigation and Prosecution of Human 
Rights Violations
Be that as it may, the Supreme Court’s decisions discussed 
in this article have a great practical significance in Argentina. 
They have paved the way for the investigation and prosecution of 
all those who had benefited from the Amnesty Laws and presi-
dential pardons. The conviction of General Videla is the best 
example in this regard. Many other convictions will likely follow 
over the next couple of years, given the long list of trials set to 
start in 2011.45 True, justice should happen in a timely fashion; 
but it is better late than not at all. HRB
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